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Introduction
There has been a long-standing interest in female labor supply
for a number of reasons
1 In general women are thought to be be more responsive to
incentives, particularly when they have children
2 Many women end up being single mothers, vulnerable to
poverty
3 The career breaks and the observed male/female wage
diﬀerentials point towards the importance or otherwise of
returns to experience
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Introduction
Over the recent decades we have built a welfare system mainly
designed to aleviate poverty and encourage women into work
The idea is that by incentivizing women into work even when
they have young children they preserve an attachment ot the
labor market so that their skills do not depreciate
A key question is how this welfare system aﬀects careers
This includes, education choice, human capital accumulation
over the life-cycle and work behaviour
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Introduction
We specify and estimate a dynamic model of female labour
supply with the following features:
Education choice is endogenous
Wages depend on accumulated experience
Women can work part-time, full time, or not at all
Marriage, spousal income and children are stochastic (but
exogenous)
Use it to assess the impact of the major welfare reforms
implemented at the turn of the century in UK
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Introduction
Key references for this paper are:
Labour supply/career models: Eckstein and Wolpin (1989),
Keane and Wolpin (1997), Adda, Dustmann, Meghir and
Robin (2011), Attanasio, Low and Sanchez (2008)
Human capital accumulation in life-cycle models: Kathy Shaw
(1989), Imai and Keane (2004)
Labour supply and taxes: Keane and Moﬃtt(1995), Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998) among many others
The impact of tax credits: Blundel, Duncan, McCrea and
Meghir (1999), Brewer et al, 2006, Francesconi and van der
Klaauw, 2004, Eissa and Liebman, 1996, Meyer and
Rosenbaum, 2001, Hotz and Scholz, 2003, Card and Robins,
2005
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Policy backgroundPolicy background
Tax credit award for couples of lone parent with 1 child
Blundell et al. Female labour supply
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Policy background (WFTC/IS)
Budget constraint for lone parents or single earners in couples
Figure 5: Net income per week by tax regime
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Notes: Woman earns £4.6 per hour. Fortax simulations.
CTB removes any gains from working in 1999 or 2002 regimes. The 2004 regime extended tax credits
to families with no children, introducing some positive incentive (although small for families in rented
accommodation) for full-time work.
For other groups, the type of accommodation is irrelevant for the woman’s working incentives.
Figure 7 shows such a case, for a couple with one child where the man is working full-time. Increased
generosity and enlargement of phasing out regions meant the WFTC regime reduced the gains from
working and the incentive to work more hours for this group. The incentives to work were not
as aﬀected by the WTC/CTC reform, at least in what concerns to part-time work as the added
generosity of this regime meant the phasing-out of tax-credits happens higher up in the distribution
of income.
7.2 Eﬀects on labour supply
Table 10 shows the simulated eﬀects on employment rates of the April 2002 and April 2004 tax regimes
as compared the pre-WFTC regime in April 1999 (FC). These are long-run eﬀects, representing life-
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Policy background (WFTC/IS)
Figure 6: Net income per week by tax regime
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Figure 7: Net income per week by tax regime
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Model: female life-cycle
Life in three stages
Three education levels chosen sequentially up to age 18/21
secondary, A-levels (high school) or vocational, university
working life
consumption and asset accumulation
labour supply (0, 20 and 40 hours per week) (0-9, 10-24, 25+
in the data)
experience accumulation
marriage and childbearing
retirement: happens deterministically at the age of 60
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Model: female earnings
Wage equation
lnwsia = lnWs + γs ln(esia+1)+υsia
υsia = ρsυsia−1+µsia
esia = esia−1 (1−δs)+gs (lsia)
g(lsia) = 1 for full-time, part-time estimated
Persistence of shocks - so we distinguish heterogeneity from
state dependence (experience eﬀects)
Correlation of initial shock with preferences
Concave proﬁle of experience eﬀects
Depreciation of human capital - cost of not working
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Model: exogenous family dynamics
Children
model youngest child, with exogenous arrival rate
arrival probability depends on female age, education, presence
of partner and older children
departure with certainty when child reaches age 18
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Model: exogenous family dynamics
Partner
random arrival depending on level of education and age
characterised by education, employment status and earnings
arrival probability for male with given education depends on
female age and education
departure probability depends on female age, presence of child
and male education
In couples, female acts as second earner, partly insuring for
shocks in other sources of income with labour supply
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Model: other family income
Male log-wage equation
lnwmsm ia = lnW
m
sm + γ
m
sm ln(a−18)+υmsm ia
υmsm ia = ρ
m
smυ
m
sm ia−1+µ
m
sm ia
Conditional on education, male and female productivity
processes are independent
Detailed model of UK tax and beneﬁt system (FORTAX)
Taxes: income tax, NI, council tax
Beneﬁts: child beneﬁt, maternity grant, tax credits, income
support, housing beneﬁt, council tax beneﬁt, free school meals
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Model: optimisation problem
Post-education
The female chooses {cia, lia}a=a,....,a during her working life to
maximise lifetime utility
Va (Xia) = Ea
[
a
∑
α=a
(cia/nia)
η
η
exp(f (liα ,Xiα))
∣∣∣∣∣Xia
]
subject to the budget constraint
kia+1 = (1+ r)kit + liawsia+d
m
ia l
m
ia w
m
sm ia−T (Xia, lia, lmia )−CCa (Xia)− cia
non-separability
uncertain environment: earnings (own and partner's) and family
composition
f (liα ,Xiα ) is a function of family composition, education and male,
unobserved heterogeneity by female employment
liquidity constraints: k > 0 but allow k >−¿15,000 for university students
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Model: optimisation problem
Education
One-oﬀ decision in knowledge of utility and monetary costs of
education
Costs correlated with initial level of productivity
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Data and estimation
BHPS
Unbalanced panel of around 6,600 females over 16 waves
10% observed in all 16 periods 60% in 6 or fewer periods 25%
observed leaving education and entering working life
Labour market outcomes during working life, income
information, detailed demographics, limited assets information
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Data and estimation
Set IES, interest rate and discount rate (Blundell, Browning
and Meghir, 1993))
Estimate exogenous parameters outside model: male earnings
and employment, family dynamics, childcare costs
Method of Simulated Moments for the rest: simulate
individuals under diﬀerent tax regimes; Compute overall
moment to match with those in the data.
207 moments, including employment rates by family type,
transition rates, means, variances and percentiles of earnings
distribution, earnings at entrance in working life, change in
earnings by past hours, education achievement,...
55 parameters to estimate
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Estimates: female wage equation
second.-GCSE HS A-Level university
wage rate (0 experience) 4.5 4.9 6.3
returns to experience 0.15 0.23 0.28
autocorrelation coef 0.92 0.95 0.88
se innovation 0.13 0.13 0.12
initial prod: mean high pref for work 0.11 0.10 0.20
initial productivity: se 0.30 0.26 0.26
depreciation rate 0.12 0.11 0.11
accumulation of HC in PTE 0.15 0.12 0.10
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Estimates: preferences
all employment PT employment
secondary HS university secondary HS university
intercept 0.41 0.41 0.47 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19
children 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
child aged 0-2 0.15 -0.05
child aged 3-5 0.07 -0.06
child aged 6-10 -0.02 0.03
child aged 11-18 -0.07 0.06
male -0.06 -0.02
male working -0.17 0.09
High pref work (p=0.51) -0.16 -0.07
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Model ﬁt
Reproduce life-cycle proﬁles of wage distribution, employment, transition
rates, as well as same proﬁles by age of child, including before and after
child is present
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Model ﬁt
!!!!"#$!%&$'(!')$#*%$#+,!&-(!%..!/-/0.%$#-+1!%..!&%*#.#')2!*0.$#/.'!)3)$'*)!
!
!
!
!
!
1.
6
1.
8
2
2.
2
2.
4
20 30 40 50
lpoly smoothing grid
s=1, data s=1, sim
s=2, data s=2, sim
s=3, data s=3, sim
Mean log hourly wage (by education)
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
20 30 40 50
age
Low education
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
20 30 40 50
age
A-levels and equivalent
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
20 30 40 50
age
University education
Percentiles 10, 25, 50 75 and 90
Female Wage Rate
data sim
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
20 30 40 50
s=1, data s=1, sim
s=2, data s=2, sim
s=3, data s=3, sim
Variance of log hourly wage (by education)
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
20 30 40 50
s=1, data s=1, sim
s=2, data s=2, sim
s=3, data s=3, sim
Inter-quartile ratio to median: log hourly wage (by education)
Blundell, Dias, Meghir, Shaw Education, Labour Supply and Welfare
Model ﬁt
Employment of mothers
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Model ﬁt
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Results: validation against empirical estimates of the impact
of WFTC
Can reproduce empirical estimates of the impact of WFTC
Eﬀect after three years of reforms for cross section of women
Table 1: The impact of WFTC reform on employment: simulated versus empirical literature results
lone married mothers
mothers all partner working partner not working
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simulated results
(1) own accommodation +5.0% -2.2% -4.2% +2.7%
(2) rented accommodation +2.4% -1.2% -2.3% +1.4%
(3) all population +3.4% -2.0% -3.9% +2.1%
Results in literature
(4) BBS, 2005 +3.6% -0.1% +2.6%
(5) FRK, 2009 +0.7%∗ +0.1-0.6%∗ 3.1%
(6) BDSS, 2006 +5.0% -0.5%
(7) BDSS, 2006 (combined) +3.7% -0.4%
Notes: BBS, 2005 stands for Blundell, Brewer and Shephard, 2005. BDSS, 2006 stands for Brewer, Duncan, Shephard and
Suarez, 2006. FRK, 2009 stands for Francesconi, Rainer and Van Der Klaauw, 2009. Estimates in row (4) are for WFTC
alone; estimates in row (5) are the combined effects of WFTC and other reforms occurring up to 2002. The latter are
comparable with estimates in rows (2) and (3). Row (1) shows simulations based on the model discussed in this paper and
effects are for first three years after unexpected change of tax regime amounting to the reforms occurring between April
1999 and April 2002.
∗ Statistical insignificant estimate at standard levels.
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Elasticities
Frisch Elasticity: eﬀect of small and anticipated transitory
change in net employment earnings
adjust initial assets so that marginal utility at start of life-cycle
remains constant
Marshallian Elasticity: permananent and unexpected change in
net employment earnings
more relevant for welfare analysis
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Results: wage elasticities of labour supply (extensive)
Large Frisch elasticites, smaller responses to (uncompensated) permanent
unexpected changes in earnings
Overall values not at odds with recent estimates for women (Blundell,
Pistaferri and Eksten, 2012)
Very heterogeneous responses to changes in earnings and income, both
especially high among low educated and lone mothers
Frisch Marshalian Income eﬀects
All 0.90 0.50 -0.41
Secondary 1.97 0.93 -0.53
A-levels 0.68 0.46 -0.40
University 0.28 0.18 -0.26
Lone mother 4.23 1.93 -0.91
Mothers in couples 0.70 0.51 -0.29
Childless women 0.33 0.20 -0.35
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Frisch Elasticities
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Marshallian Elasticities
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Income Eﬀects
Unearned income increased at each point in the lifecycle
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Results: long-run eﬀects of WFTC & IS (2002)
Revenue neutral reforms
No education choice
(ppt) Single Mother Couple with Kids
GCSE HS Uni GCSE HS Uni
2002 WFTC
employment 9.9 12.9 7.9 -6.2 -4.6 -2.0
FTE 4.9 2.6 -4.2 -3.4 -2.9 -1.7
2002 WFTC + IS
employment 4.8 5.2 2.7 -7.1 -5.7 -2.4
FTE 3.1 0.6 -5.4 -3.7 -3.3 -2.0
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Education Choice and WFTC & IS (2002)
Impact relative to 1999 system, allowing for education choice,
but by pre-reform (1999) education choice
(ppt) Single Mother Couple with Kids
GCSE HS Uni GCSE HS Uni
2002 WFTC
employment 9.9 12.3 1.5 -6.2 -4.9 -3.9
FTE 4.8 1.9 -9.7 -3.5 -3.4 -3.8
2002 WFTC + IS
employment 4.8 4.4 -5.0 -7.2 -6.0 -4.6
FTE 2.9 -0.3 -12.4 -4.0 -4.0 -4.3
Blundell, Dias, Meghir, Shaw Education, Labour Supply and Welfare
Impact on Education Shares
Increase in unskilled labour
GCSE HS Uni.
Pre-reform 31.8 47.2 20.9
2002 WFTC 33.2 46.9 19.7
2002 WFTC + IS 33.8 46.7 19.4
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And how much does it cost?
Adjustment in basic tax rate to keep budget deicit at
pre-reform level
Education choice
pre-reform post-refom
2002 WFTC +1.4 +2.1
2002 WFTC + IS +2.3 +3.2
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Risk, Insurance and WFTC
Increasing the variance of the productivity shock
Willingness to pay in consumption terms; compare to change
in output (gross wealth).
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Discussion
Women with high labour market attachment respond less to
the new incentives
Women with low attachment have a very elastic LS and large
income responses as well
Tax credits have more or less equal and opposite responses for
single and married women with children
There is a small eﬀect on education choice, pushing some
women to obtain less education
The insurance value of the welfare program is substantial,
particularly for the lowest skill
Blundell, Dias, Meghir, Shaw Education, Labour Supply and Welfare
